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FOREWORD: TO AMERICA'S TOMORROW-
COMMERCE, COMMUNICATION,
AND THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH
Ronald KL. Collins*
To Steve Shiffrin, whose passion for freedom reminds us
that life without dissent is worthless, even if we must suffer
some because of it.
Communication is a hallmark of life. Remove it and only naked
existence remains, or worse still, death. We live by words-and
signs and symbols and sights and sounds. Each time we
communicate, we engage not only the principle of liberty, but also
the fact of life itself. How we use that fact of life or abuse that
principle of liberty depends on what values we as a people hold dear.
Still, free communication is, and whenever possible should be, the
default position. We start there, with free communicative
interaction, not forced silence. The First Amendment is thus both a
sign of freedom and a guarantor of it.
Some think that life cannot default to communicative liberty.
There are, they say, too many types of expression that simply cannot
be countenanced in a just society. The risks of such freedom, we are
told time and again, are simply too great. This argument is, I think,
too facile; to accept it as gospel is to confuse the vast and wondrous
sea with its rare and risky riptides. For the everyday experiences of
communication-those trillions and trillions of expressive trans-
actions-far outnumber the relatively few instances in which a just
society need exercise censorial power.
* Scholar, First Amendment Center, Washington, D.C. Decades ago I was introduced to
the world of the First Amendment by a law review colleague, Steve Shiffrin. It was a wondrous
beginning and has been a wonderful ride, one that has yet to run its course. For that alone, I am
indebted to Steve. Speaking of debts, I owe yet another one to Dave Skover for his much
welcome comments on this Foreword. And special thanks go as well to Professor James
Weinstein and Dean Ellen Aprill who made this Symposium, and the conference that preceded it,
possible.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
In the America of our times, let us celebrate expressive
freedom-that liberty to speak as we think, to think as we please, to
sing and dance as we wish, to paint as we like, to assemble as we
want, to worship as our consciences will, to hear or see what we
want, and to howl at a world gone mad. Let us speak to power with
fists held high and protest at the altars of the righteous with irritating
irreverence. May we revel in our freedom with wild and proud
abandon. After all, we are Americans!
True, we live in the shadows of history. At times that history
has been a "legacy of suppression"'-times when tyrants intoxicated
with power silenced anyone who did not bend to their will. No
wonder that when we think of the horrific excesses of suppression
we revere a Madisonian vision of free speech freedom that elevates
political expression to the highest rung of First Amendment
protection.
Revere that yester-year ideal as we might, we can no longer lay
claim to the earth from which it sprang. Neither law nor its ideals
can be frozen in Proustian frames. For ours is a new world, a brave
new world.' And in that world, commerce is a lodestar of life and
law.' Our freedom is inextricably linked to it; the dye of advanced
capitalism cannot be removed from the solution in the beaker of life
of modem America.' Hence, communication, too, is connected to
commerce. Like it or not, that fact has profound consequences for
any system of freedom of expression that aspires to protect a liberty
at once relevant and at the same time robust.
The Liberal Divide
To what extent, if any, can liberalism endorse the ever-
burgeoning commercial speech agenda without forsaking its
credentials as a progressive movement? For example, can liberalism
1. The phrase is that of my late friend Leonard W. Levy, who combined a great knowledge
of constitutional history with an abiding love for constitutional freedom. See LEONARD W. LEVY,
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS, at vii-xix (1985). From Len I learned a lesson he in turn had
learned as a young man: "Frankfurter taught me to criticize my most cherished beliefs by
demanding valid evidence for any proposition." LEONARD W. LEVY, RANTERS RUN AMOK: AND
OTHER ADVENTURES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAW 58 (2000). If I have departed from any of my
previously held views, I have done so in that spirit-and I reserve the right to do so again!
2. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 3-7
(Carolina Academic Press, 2d. ed. 2005) (1996) [hereinafter DOD2].
3. See id. at67-135.
4. See id. at 69-199.
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retain its commitment to a spirited humanitarian ethic, its special
sensitivity to the underclass, and its protective paternalism while at
the same time defending the communicative agenda of colossal
corporations? These are not rhetorical questions; they are tough
questions for liberals long wed to free speech principles. Years ago,
such questions caught the attention of a few contemporary liberals,
especially Professor Steven Shiffrin.' Even so, the day of any
concerted and organized phalanx of liberal opposition to commercial
expression has yet to dawn. Why?
One answer: liberals are conflicted. On the one hand, they value
First Amendment freedoms and are therefore hesitant to yield power
to government to censor expression. On the other hand, they have
long believed that the wellbeing of people should not be trumped by
the vicissitudes of corporate constitutionalism. In other words,
liberals are of two minds when it comes to commercial
communication.
As contemporary liberals ponder this matter, let none forget that
the modern commercial speech doctrine owes its birthright to able
ACLU lawyers such as Melvin Wulf, who successfully argued
Bigelow v. Virginia,6 and talented Ralph Nader progressive liberals
such as Alan Morrison, who successfully argued Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.7
That is, the commercial speech doctrine that was once rejected by
liberal jurists-including Justices Hugo Black and William 0.
Douglas'-was revived by a new generation of liberal lawyers.
Ironically, the one who first pointed modern liberals to the idea
that commercial speech conflicted with traditional liberalism was
none other than the late conservative William Rehnquist. He did so
5. To be precise, it caught Professor Shiffrin's attention some 23 years ago. See Steven
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1984) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Away from a General
Theory]; see also STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA
33-40, 53-54 (1999) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE]; STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 52-55, 82, 105, 106, 152, 209-10 (1990)
[hereinafter SHIFFRIN, FIRST AMENDMENT].
6. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Alan Morrison, of Public Citizen, filed an amicus brief supporting
the commercial speech claim.
7. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
8. See their votes in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Virginia
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758-61. But see Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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in his dissent in a landmark commercial speech case9 argued by a
noted liberal. °  In his Central Hudson dissent, then-Justice
Rehnquist declared:
The Court [today] returns to the bygone era of Lochner v.
New York, in which it was common practice for this Court
to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State
based on the Court's own notions of the most appropriate
means for the State to implement its considered policies."
Later, Justice Rehnquist added this cautionary note: "[T]he Court
unlocked a Pandora's Box when it 'elevated' commercial speech to
the level of traditional political speech by according it First
Amendment protection . ". . . 2 And it was Justice Antonin Scalia,
that pater of modern constitutional conservatism, who almost a
decade later scaled back some of the then-emerging constitutional
protection afforded to commercial expression. With a nod from
Justice Rehnquist and others, in Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox3 Justice Scalia boldly declared: "Our
jurisprudence has emphasized that 'commercial speech [enjoys] a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is subject to
'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.""... And on that scale, as weighed by
conservatives such as Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, commercial
expression was quite often "subordinate" to any variety of competing
government values."'
9. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 583-606 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. Telford Taylor successfully argued the case for the Appellant. See generally Richard
Severo, Telford Taylor, Who Prosecuted Top Nazis at the Nuremberg War Trials, Is Dead at 90,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1998, at A37 (describing Telford Taylor's life and accomplishments,
including his involvement as the chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials). Burt Neubome, of
ACLU fame, filed an amicus brief on behalf of Long Island Lighting Co.
11. 447 U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 598.
13. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
14. Id. at 477 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
15. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding state bar
rules prohibiting direct mail solicitation of accident victims); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993) (upholding local ban on the distribution, via news rack, of
"commercial handbills," with Scalia, J., joining majority opinion); id. at 438-46 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987)
(upholding limits on commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olympic"); Posadas de
[Vol. 41: 1
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To some it would seem curious, to say the least, that such
conservatives would embrace a free speech jurisprudence with FDR
New Deal overtones and that liberals would distance themselves
from it. 6  But alas, fortuna turned the tables yet again as
conservative Justices came to embrace commercial expression while
liberals raised a lance against it. Just consider the 2001 case of
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 7 There the Court, by a 5-4 vote,
struck down Massachusetts's regulations governing the advertising
and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. The lineup:
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas for the
majority with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer in
dissent. Meanwhile, Justice Thomas wanted to ratchet up protection
for commercial speech by urging a "strict scrutiny" standard in such
cases.
18
Things took yet another ideological back flip when Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky"9 came before the Court. In that case, the Justices were
confronted with the issue of whether a multi-national corporation
that engaged in sweatshop practices abroad could be silenced by a
consumer activist seeking to punish the company for its allegedly
misleading public relations responses to its critics.2"
In the high Court, Nike had the best liberal representation one
could imagine-Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School,
Walter Dellinger (former Hugo Black clerk and former acting
Solicitor General in the Clinton Administration), and Thomas
Goldstein, then of Goldstein & Howe. The sage constitutionalist, the
seasoned scholar turned skillful lawyer, and the boy wonder of
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986) (upholding Puerto
Rico's ban on promotional advertising of casino gambling); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 19
(1979) (upholding limits on optometric trade names); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456, 468 (upholding
limits on lawyer solicitation).
16. In this regard, Bruce Johnson makes an important point: "So, the development of the
commercial speech doctrine reflects the changes in models of economic regulation, moving from
a New Deal-based government regulation system to a system based more on free markets and
deregulation." Bruce E.H. Johnson, First Amendment Commercial Speech Protections: A
Practitioner's Guide, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 303 (2007).
17. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
18. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 518-28 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
19. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
20. The full account of the case and the story behind it are set out in Ronald K.L. Collins &
David M. Skover, Foreword: The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky
Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 968-1024 (2004) [hereinafter Collins & Skover, Nike].
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Supreme Court litigation were the trio that Nike hoped would change
its fortune.
On the other side of the liberal divide, Marc Kasky, the
consumer activist, received amicus support from such noted liberals
as Alan B. Morrison and David Vladeck of the Public Citizen
Litigation Group, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, then of the
University of Southern California School of Law, and Professor
Tamara R. Piety of Oklahoma University of Tulsa College of Law.2'
After Nike was argued the Court withdrew jurisdiction in the
case. Notably, only Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, offered a First Amendment defense for Nike, albeit a
most limited one.2
What Nike reveals is that both liberal lawyers and their liberal
counterparts on the Court were all over the ideological map when it
came to vouchsafing the free speech rights of the mammoth
corporation. That fact alone speaks volumes about the breadth of the
divide in the liberal community when it comes to First Amendment
protection for commercial speech and corporations.
"The most powerful actors in our society-largely
corporations-are now wielding the First Amendment in ways that
often seem counter to [progressive] goals. 23 So warned the editors
of The Nation in July of 1997 in a Symposium entitled Speech &
Power. The problem, in the progressive eye, was that yesterday's
free speech principles had become today's power principles-for the
powerful. The First Amendment, so the charge ran, had become yet
another weapon in the arsenal of the captains of commerce, a weapon
to be used against the powerless. For that arsenal, Nike was a case
marked with dangerous potential.
For others, the Nike controversy had less to do with corporate
power than with constitutional principle. After all, the argument
went, the great marketplace-of-ideas principle 24 is betrayed when
21. See id. at 990, 998-99.
22. See Nike, 539 U.S. at 665-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Collins & Skover, Nike, supra
note 20, at 1014-19.
23. Editorial, Speech & Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION, July 21,
1997, at 11.
24. Years ago, Shiffrin expressed his reservations about the marketplace principle. See
STEVEN SHIFFRIN, Marketplace of Ideas, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53, 53 (1990) ("Milton
spoke of a free and open encounter; Holmes spoke of the competition of the marketplace. A
recurrent problem in First Amendment cases is that these two notions are not the same.").
[Vol. 41:1
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corporate critics hurl barbs but corporations can't speak back.
Moreover, could the First Amendment meaningfully exist in a
capitalist culture without safeguarding corporate speech? Believing
not, many noted free speech advocates saw great potential in Nike.
That is, they hoped the case would become the New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan25 counterpart for commercial speech.
And then there is the troublesome trio of compelled exaction
cases-Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,26 United States v.
United Foods, Inc.,27 and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n.28
Here again, liberal Justices voted in every which doctrinal direction,
with Justice David Souter consistently voting to sustain all such First
Amendment challenges and Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg voting to deny all such claims in the same cases.
There you have it. Remarkably, in the span of a single lifetime
we have witnessed the following progression:
" Liberal justices denying First Amendment protection to
commercial expression;
* Liberal lawyers defending such expression;
* Conservative justices denouncing commercial speech;
" Conservative justices defending it;
* Liberal justices denouncing the contemporary commercial
speech doctrine as implemented by conservative and
libertarian jurists;29
* Liberal lawyers fighting amongst themselves over whether to
protect the commercial speech of corporations;
* A liberal justice" defending the First Amendment rights of a
multi-national corporation charged with exploiting its
workers; and
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
27. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
28. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
29. For a discussion of libertarian jurists, see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid
of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990), and Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The
Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993). As of this
date, only Alex Kozinski is a judge, but Professor Banner's day may come. On the merits of their
arguments, compare DOD2, supra note 2, at 122-28. and Ronald K.L. Collins & David M.
Skover, The Psychology of First Amendment Scholarship: A Reply, 71 TEX. L. REV. 819, 827-30
(1993).
30. Of course, there is an irony here in the case of Justice Breyer, who despite his reputation
as a "liberal" has the worst First Amendment voting record on the current Court when it comes to
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* Liberal justices fighting amongst themselves over whether to
protect commercial speech rights in compelled exaction
cases.
Troubling as these facts are, the conceptual problems associated with
commercial expression extend beyond the boundaries of ideologies.3'
Definitional Dilemmas
Several of the articles in this Symposium suggest the need for a
degree of definitional clarity about this type of expression. That is:
how precisely can courts define "commercial speech " if it is to be
regulated differently from political speech?
This question is far more complex than usually thought, for the
domain of commercial expression is immense. In this regard,
Professor James Weinstein makes a telling point: "[T]he large range
of speech regulated by securities, antitrust, labor, copyright, food and
drug, and health and safety laws, together with the array of speech
regulated by the common law of contract, negligence and fraud" all
exist without much of a "hint of interference from the First
Amendment."32  In other words, there is, as Ronald Dworkin has
observed, a "vast range" of commercial speech acts (and others, too)
"that are plainly not protected by the First Amendment."33 Hence,
unless one is prepared to untie such bodies of law from their
historical moorings, there will be a need to define "commercial
speech" with far more precision than it has heretofore received. For
example, could there not be a range of categories of commercial
speech that might be subject to different levels of constitutional
expression cases. See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000,
48 UCLA L. REv. 1191 (2001), updated at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2007).
3 1. While thus far I have focused mainly on liberals and liberalism, there is, to be sure, also
division among conservative thinkers re the value of commercial speech in our system of free
expression, though I wonder whether the divide is as great as that among liberal thinkers.
Conservative critics of commercial speech include William Rehnquist, Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971), and
Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 22 n.43,
39-40 (1986).
32. James Weinstein, Fools, Knaves, and the Protection of Commercial Speech: A Response
to Professor Redish, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 141 (2007).
33. Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at
21 n. 15 (discussing campaign finance laws).
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scrutiny?34 Having said that, it is useful to remember that the
tendency of our modem system of free expression is, by and large, to
expand the domain of protected expression.35
Another point to consider is that speech in our modern
communicative system is seldom one-dimensional, i.e., seldom simply
"'political" or "commercial" or "scientific" or "entertainment."
Literally, we often communicate mixed messages. This should not
be surprising in a highly commercial-entertainment mass
communication culture such as ours. Of course, messages that mix
commercial speech with other kinds of expression36 make for
definitional complexities. And then there are those messages that are
largely imagistic, artistic, or emotive and have little meaningful
informational content.37 Moreover, there is the Nike problem38 as to
when, if ever, a for-profit corporation can enter the marketplace of
discourse without its message being categorically labeled as
commercial expression and thereby subject to greater government
censorship.
In all of these respects, and others, the Bigelow-Bolger
definitions39 of commercial speech seem, yet again, inadequate to
resolve such analytical problems. That is, their definitional
criterion-speech that proposes a "purely commercial transac-
tion"a--is hardly applicable to many of today's methods of mass
34. See Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech: A New Analytical
Framework for the 21st Century, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 127 (2007).
35. For example, one need only consider the relatively recent First Amendment protection of
speech in judicial elections. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). Here,
too, one witnesses the all-too-predictable impact of commerce on such expression. See, e.g.,
Robert Barnes, Judicial Races Now Rife with Politics: Corporate Funds Help Fuel Change,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at Al.
36. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 9-33, 69-97.
37. See id. at 99-119.
38. See Collins & Skover, Nike, supra note 20.
39. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820-22 (1975) (stating that commercial speech
does no "more than simply propose a commercial transaction") (emphasis added); see also Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (noting that "our decisions have recognized
'the "common-sense" distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech"')
(citation omitted). Notice that Bolger did not qualify its definition the way Bigelow did when
Bigelow used terms such as "purely" or "simply." See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
40. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821-22 (emphasis added); see also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
762 (speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction"' (citation omitted)
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n On Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973))).
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commercial advertising. Until this problem is addressed with some
more calibrated definitional criteria, attempts to regulate "commer-
cial speech" will often be underinclusive or overinclusive. (Be that
as it may, Professor James Weinstein nonetheless embraces these
definitions-i.e., speech that "does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction'"-as a tenet of his own First Amendment
jurisprudence.42)
Beyond such definitional considerations, there are also other
concerns. For example, to what extent does the profit motive,
standing alone, deny commercial expression a greater measure of
protection than it might otherwise receive? Assume, for example,
that two people trafficked in sexually explicit content on the Internet,
one for profit, the other for mere pleasure. A variation of this
question recently surfaced in oral arguments in United States v.
Williams.43 Now the response may be that absent a profit motive
there is no commercial speech. Hence, such speech would be
protected unless it was deemed to be obscene. But what if a for-
profit Internet service provider posted that same content (assuming it
was non-obscene) on the Web? Would that be regulated as middle-
tier protected commercial expression or would such expression
receive more protection owing to the fact that the ISP should be
deemed a press entity, thus entitling its expression to greater
constitutional safeguards?'
All of this would make even Heraclitus's 45 head spin. It is
against that backdrop that we come to this Symposium in honor of
41. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (emphasis added) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
42. See Weinstein, supra note 32, at 133 n.3. Under that view, much of modem commercial
advertising would seem to fall outside of such definitional boundaries, if only because such
advertising does more than propose a commercial transaction. See, e.g., DOD2, supra note 2, at
88-89, 114. Assuming such advertising is not false or misleading, and does otherwise fall within
any categories of First Amendment exceptions, how would Professor Weinstein analyze such
speech as a First Amendment matter? What level of First Amendment scrutiny would be employ
and why? Might such creative forms of, say, lifestyle advertising, be akin to artistic expression?
If so, how would he analyze such expression under the First Amendment?
43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-24, United States v. Williams, No. 06-694 (U.S. Oct.
30, 2007), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/06-
694.pdf.
44. Regarding the question of profit-motivated expression, see infra text accompanying
notes 75-81.
45. Heraclitus was the Presocratic philosopher who maintained that nothing endures but
change. See W.K.C. GUTHRIE, A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY: THE EARLIER
[Vol. 41:1
FOREWORD
Steven Shiffrin. Before saying more about the Sympo-sium's main
topic, a prefatory note is in order.
There is, to put it mildly, something strange about honoring
Professor Shiffrin by way of a symposium on, of all things,
commercial speech. It would be rather like honoring Walt Whitman
with an Adam Smith award. If Steve were to be duly honored, it
would be instead by way of a symposium on dissent46 -robust and
romantic dissent. Until that day comes, however, perhaps it might be
enough, in the fighting spirit of the First Amendment, to have a
vigorous debate over the value, if any, of commercial expression.
The Scholars (and Paters):
Shiffrin, Emerson, Meiklejohn et al.
It is well to point out that Steve Shiffrin's famous essay, The
First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment,47 was a response to the work of
someone he greatly admired-Thomas I. Emerson, the famed First
Amendment and civil rights law scholar.48 Emerson's idea was "to
apply a comprehensive and effective theory of the First Amendment
to the various problems that arise in the operation of the free
expression system."49 That general theory was one he ventured to
apply in his famous tract The System of Freedom of Expression.
Such general theorizing about the First Amendment prompted a
respectful dissent from Professor Shiffrin °
PRESOCRATICS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS 449-53 (1967); see also FRAGMENTS: THE
COLLECTED WISDOM OF HERACLITUS (Brooks Haxton trans., 2001).
46. Interestingly enough, a recent law review piece links the protection of commercial
expression with the dissent principle. See Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and the Commercial
Speech Doctrine, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1899-1912 (2007); see also Seana Shiffrin,
Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 323 n.30
(2007) [hereinafter Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association]. Over a decade-and-a-half ago, Steve
Shiffrin discussed the relationship between dissent and commercial expression. See STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 5, at 209-10 nn. 174-76.
47. Shiffrin, Away from a General Theory, supra note 5.
48. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966); see also 1 NORMAN DORSEN, PAUL BENDER & BURT NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER &
DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1976).
49. THOMAS T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 16 (1970).
50. In the interest of clarity, I should be more specific and make clear that I am referring to
Professor Steven Shiffrin. As for Professor Seana Shiffrin, she notes: "To Steve's mild chagrin,
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Notably, by Emerson's own concession, his system of protective
expression did not apply to "commercial activities." 1 In the hands of
one of Emerson's many students, C. Edwin Baker, that casual aside
paved the way for a breathtaking proposition, namely, that "a
complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial speech
is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment
theory."52  Sympathetic as Shiffrin has been to some of Baker's
arguments in this arena, he has declined the invitation to endorse
such views in toto 3 That is, he refused to be categorical, opting
instead to be contextual. What that meant was that he neither
embraced a general theory to protect nor rejected a constitutional
shelter for commercial speech. Rather, and with his trademark
modesty, he noted:
I offer neither a bold new methodology, nor any
creative "solution" to the commercial speech problem here.
It is precisely because the problem is so difficult that both
courts and commentators have been groping to find their
way. If I have a contribution to make, it is to show why this
difficulty exists, why the commercial speech problem is in
fact many problems, and why the small questions will not
go away.54
Indeed, and as Shiffrin had emphasized years earlier, "the
wisdom of first amendment jurisprudence is its recognition that the
interests promoted by the first amendment are numerous and that
my attraction to philosophical thinking comes hand in hand with an instinct toward trying to
locate general, unifying principles." Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, supra note 46, at
318.
51. EMERSON, supra note 49, at 19-20.
52. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 3 (1976) (emphasis added). The "denial" it seems turned out to be less than entirely
"complete." See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, in CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 45, 92-93 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1980) [hereinafter Baker, Scope]
("[I]t may be difficult to determine whether the commercial publisher and distributor, the more
typical defendant in an obscenity prosecution, manifests a liberty interest or a market-enforced
profit motive. However, the first amendment protects one particular industry-the press-from
regulations relating to its product on a fourth estate theory and on the basis of the conclusion that
generally its product, print or speech, contributes importantly to its recipients' liberty while not
itself being coercively or violently destructive."). For a discussion of Baker's "liberty interest" in
obscenity, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Pornographic State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1374, 1390-94 (1994).
53. See Shiffrin, Away from a General Theory, supra note 5, at 1245-51 ("Criticizing
Baker's Approach").
54. Id. at 1216.
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government abridgements of speech impact on those interests in
different ways."" In other words, more than a quarter-of-a-century
ago Professor Shiffrin anticipated the controversy that would divide
liberals (and others), and offered some sage advice for resolving such
conflicts. Even so, and as this Symposium so vividly details, the
controversy continues to play out in a variety of complex ways.
Like the progressive lawyers who reinvigorated commercial
speech in the modern area, Steve Shiffrin is most comfortable
protecting certain forms of commercial expression that involve
"informational advertising."56 Such expression, in his guarded
argument, "should get a measure of First Amendment protection."57
By stark contrast, Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional liberal, is
nowhere as grudging in his willingness to safeguard commercial
speech. "Is there a compelling reason," he asks, "for stopping
particular speech? And if there's not a compelling reason, then we
should allow all of the speech to go forward."58 No hierarchies, no
categories, no speaker-based distinctions-that is, no abridgements
of any kind absent a showing of some demonstrable compelling
interest to abridge expression.
Kathleen Sullivan, another liberal (with libertarian leanings),
actually fortifies Professor Chemerinsky's rather generous protection
for commercial speech by assigning a value for doing so. "[W]hen
we tell people what they can hear or read, or listen to, or watch," she
admonishes, "we're doing it to prevent ideas from reaching and
influencing them . . . ." By that measure, she adds, "commercial
speech does occupy the same world as other kinds of speech when
we fear government intervention to be paternalistic, to tell us what to
55. Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, in
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 52, at 9, 28. Contra Laurence H.
Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA,
supra note 52, at 1-7.
56. See Steven Shiffrin, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium:
Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 23-24, 2007), in Thoughts on Commercial
Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 333, 336 (2007). For Shiffrin's critique
of Virginia Pharmacy, see SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, supra note 5, at 40-41.
57. Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 336.
58. Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of Donald Bren School of Law, University of California,
Irvine, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech:
Past, Present & Future (Feb. 23-24, 2007), in Thoughts on Commercial Speech: A Roundtable
Discussion, supra note 56, at 337.
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think, to engage in thought control, to intervene between our
thoughts and our actions." 9
It is at this juncture where Shiffrin proudly waves the old liberal
flag of paternalism.6" After all, he is, by his own admission, "an old-
fashioned paternalist."'" If not for such paternalism, he reminds us,
the Securities and Exchange Commission would be barred from
policing the content of proxy materials in corporate elections.62
Moreover, if not for such paternalism, the Food and Drug
Administration could never regulate what companies can or cannot
say about drugs.63 Precisely such nuanced paternalism, if you will,
finds learned application in David Vladeck's contribution to this
Symposium, wherein he skillfully argues that reasonable minds
might well pause before guaranteeing the commercial speech rights
of corporations to engage in direct-to-consumer ads for risky
pharmaceutical products such as Vioxx and Celebrex. 4 The recent
alarm over cold medications for children, which had been marketed
to the tune of $50 million annually, buttresses Vladeck's cautionary
admonition.
6 5
As for a one-test-suits-all kind of jurisprudence, the Court has
never, Shiffrin reminds us, adopted a compelling state interest test in
all kinds of speech cases. That is, classification of the kinds of
expression involved informs the test to be employed. Witness, for
example, the law of defamation, where a compelling state interest
59. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, Remarks at the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 23-
24, 2007), in Thoughts on Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, supra note 56, at 338.
60. See, e.g., SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, supra note 5, at 37-38 (arguing how, in certain
areas of the law, paternalism is both permitted and encouraged).
61. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Steven Shiffrin, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 23-24, 2007), in
Thoughts on Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, supra note 56, at 346.
62. See Shiffrin, Away from a General Theory, supra note 5, at 1231. But even in this area,
and consistent with Shiffrin's eclectic approach, he points out there is some room for possible
First Amendment intervention. See id. (explaining that "the SEC editing proxy materials on the
basis of what is true or false on matters of domestic and foreign policy should at least cause first
amendment eyebrows to lift.").
63. See Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 338-39.
64. See David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259, 274-76 (2007); see also David C. Vladeck, Devaluing Truth: Unverified
Health Claims in the Aftermath of Pearson v. Shalala, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 535 (1999).
65. See Rob Stein, Cold Remedies Are Unproven for Children, FDA Panel Says: Group
Advises Against Use in Kids Younger than Age 6, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2007, at Al; Rob Stein,
Children's Cold Remedies Raised Questions for Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2007, at Al.
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test is not employed in some contexts.66 Moreover, it is well to recall
that one of the mainstays of First Amendment jurisprudence, the
doctrine against prior restraints, does not apply to commercial
expression." But is that not simply another way of saying that in
such instances the government does indeed have a compelling
interest in invoking prior restraints in the commercial speech
context? Put another way, is the state's interest not sufficiently
compelling whenever food and drug advertisers make false claims
about their products, claims likely to cause real harm? By contrast,
in the political arena such falsehoods can receive constitutional
protection.68 Is the lesson, then, in all of this that Shiffrin has it right,
that categories of speech do matter and that constitutional tests must
vary depending on the context? Or does Chemerinsky have the
better argument that no matter the category or context, whenever the
government has a compelling interest, it may regulate or even ban
otherwise protected expression, regardless of the constitutional
vernacular employed?
For Professor Shiffrin, commercial expression "should be lower
in the hierarchy of First Amendment values than other forms of
speech. ' '69 That claim troubles Professor Sullivan. We live "in a new
world," she stresses. And in that world, commercial speech is often
"continuous with, and perhaps indispensable to, the flow of speech in
the rest of society."7  Is this but another way of saying, or
suggesting, that in today's America communication is often
inseparable from commerce?" If so, what flows from that fact about
the liberty Americans enjoy daily in their highly commercialized
66. See Shiffrin, supra note 56 at 338-39.
67. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771-72, 771 n.24 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (envisioning the
possibility of constitutionally permissible prior restraints in "exceptional cases"); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1048 (2nd ed. 1988) (noting the
"certainty" that can "ordinarily be obtained in the context of prepublication restraints on the
publication of . . . commercial advertisements" as a possible justification for prior restraint of
false statements).
68. See, e.g., Rickert v. State, 168 P.3d 826, 832 (Wash. 2007) (striking down a law that
barred political candidates from deliberately making false statements regarding their opponents).
On the larger topic of a "constitutional right to lie," see Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike:
Exposing Nike's Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151, 184-88 (2005).
69. See Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 336.
70. See Sullivan, supra note 59, at 340.
71. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 697 (1993) (expanded in DOD2, supra note 2, at 67-135).
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world? To move the argument a step further, can one reasonably
devalue the coin of commercial expression without at the same time
devaluing the currency of modem capitalism? If not, wholesale
attacks on commercial speech are, in effect, attacks on American
capitalism per se.
Just such an attack was long ago leveled by one of the principal
theorists of liberal free speech jurisprudence, Alexander Meiklejohn,
a proud paternalist who championed the value of self-governance.
His views on this subject merit repetition:
On the whole, the "liberties" of what we call "Free
Enterprise" are, I think, destructive of the "freedoms" of a
self-governing society. The unregulated self-seeking of the
profit-makers is much more dangerous in its effect upon the
morality and intelligence of the citizen than that
participation in regulatory action for the common good to
which free enterprise has so often shown itself hostile.72
By that normative measure, protecting commercial expression is
largely outside the domain of the First Amendment and more
accurately within that of the liberty guarantee of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In this sense, such thought somewhat
resembles that of another old liberal, Justice Hugo Black,73 who saw
commercial expression outside the ambit of core speech.74
At the risk of unintended misinterpretation, I think such critiques
of commercial expression go to the heart of the capitalist state-the
for-profit corporation.75 However intended, they war, at bottom,
with the life we have come to know in the modern commercial
72. Malcolm Sharp, Foreword to ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE, at xv-xvi (1960).
73. Justice Black's view of due process was, apart from the 14 h Amendment's use in the
incorporation doctrine, quite limited. See, e.g., HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 23-42 (1969); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 873, 877, 879
(1960); Hugo L. Black & Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A
Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 563 (1962); see also GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 205-69 (Lexington Books 2005).
74. Recall Justice Black's vote in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled
by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
75. Regarding free speech principles and for-profit corporate speakers, Professor Schauer
has observed: "The interest of the speaker is recognized not primarily as an end but only
instrumentally to the public interest in the ideas presented. As a result the motives or corporate
status of the speaker are almost wholly irrelevant." FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 159 (1982).
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state.76 Hence, it should come as no surprise that the corporate
perpetuator of much of the life in that state should be signaled out for
condemnation. For some, like Professor Tamara Piety, corporations
should have no First Amendment rights.77 Here again, she does not
mean all corporations. Like Professor Baker, Professor Piety would
exempt both non-profit corporations and media for-profit
corporations from the scope of her argument.78 While I find such
distinctions analytically and culturally troublesome, I suspect the
idea is to root out as much of the evils of corporate expression as
textually possible, duly mindful that the "press" finds explicit
mention within the forty-five words of the 1791 guarantee. If so, is
this not the triumph of the old formalism over the new realities of our
modem commercial media culture? I raise this question as someone
sympathetic to several of the same concerns about the dangers of the
new corporate constitutionalism.
Ever the lover of contextual and analytical gradations, here is
how Professor Shiffrin weighs in on this matter: "[M]edia speech is
not-with narrow exceptions-commercial speech. ' ' 79 Hence, unlike
commercial expression generally, corporate for-profit media
expression may often be entitled to a generous measure of First
Amendment protection, but not categorically so, and this despite the
toll it wreaks on elevated principles of rational discourse.8" I wonder
whether, if Professor Shiffrin examined today's commercial media
culture more critically and extensively, he might not wish to rethink
this entire matter.
76. See generally SAMUEL P. NELSON, BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE POLITICS OF
FREE SPEECH AND PLURALISM 84 (2005) ("Aside from a full-blown critique of capitalism ... it
is difficult to understand why profit-oriented speech should be singled out for ... strong
criticism.").
77. See Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech
and the Problem that Won't Go Away, 41 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 181, 193-98 (2007) [hereinafter
Piety, Market Failure]; see also, Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression,
29 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 2008). For one reply to such arguments, see Martin H.
Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 86-92 (2007) [hereinafter Redish, Commercial
Speech].
78. Presumably, that would include, as in Baker's scheme, for-profit media corporations that
trade in explicit sexual expression of all kinds short of those deemed by a court to be legally
obscene.
79. Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 342.
80. See DOD2, supra note 2, at xxiii-xxx, 1-65.
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Under the Piety-Baker-Shiffrin logic, is a for-profit corporation
that produces jug wine ads entitled to any First Amendment
protection when it simply provides truthful advertising information
about the cost of its product?81 If not, why? Perhaps pateralism z-
we as a society care too much about the plight of alcoholics to
subject them to ads that entice them to drink ever more and more.
But does not such a rule infantilize the rest of us and thereby deprive
us of useful information about a product that can be consumed in
moderation? If so, how much of such paternalism will liberals and
conservatives tolerate? That is, how far should the "vice" exception
to the First Amendment extend? To advertising about cigarettes,83
fast foods,84 sugary foods, and dietary supplements? What about gas-
guzzling automobiles? How about ads for violent video games for
kids? 5 Or what about ads for the most destructive kind of product
that daily drains the Madisonian mind?-commercial television.86
That is, the "logic" of much of commercial television is contrary to
the logic of an enlightened, self-governing Madisonian society.
81. Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 343. There are, to be sure, other reasons why some maintain
that certain corporations should have no First Amendment commercial speech rights.
82. See Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent": An Exploration of the Psychology of
Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377,
396-407, 422-49 (2001).
83. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and
Commercial Speech, 56 U. IN. L. REV. 1205 (1988). On this point, Shiffrin reveals how his
First Amendment jurisprudence is linked to his paternalism: "Four hundred thousand people die
every year because they smoke tobacco. Tobacco advertising reaches children, and there are
brand favorites among children with respect to cigarettes. Should we have a compelling state
interest test with respect to that?" Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 344-45.
84. See Piety, Market Failure, supra note 77, at 221-23 (noting unwillingness to invoke
paternalism to outlaw such foods, while receptive to limiting commercial speech rights regarding
such products).
85. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) (striking
down such a law). It should be noted that video games are, like television generally, a medium of
communication. By that measure, they would be exempt from the Baker "press exception" to his
argument. In this regard, recall his argument in Baker, Scope, supra note 52, at 92-93.
86. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of
Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1105 (1990), expanded and revised in DOD2, supra note 2,
at 1-65; see also Sharp, supra note 72, at xvi. In our critiques of the entertainment, commercial,
and sexual cultures in The Death of Discourse, we discussed any variety of "problems" and
responses, all related to the subject of expression. While we were bold and satirical at times, the
careful reader should note that we never took a final position on a particular First Amendment
"problem" or response. We left that task to our reader. DOD2, supra note 2, at 249 ("You be the
judge.").
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Virginia Pharmacy8 7 and its progeny notwithstanding, much of
American advertising has moved well beyond the informational
model that rests at the heart of the informed consumer rationale
espoused by Justice Harry Blackmun. Martin Redish realized that
very point thirty-seven years ago." In that sense, as illustrated in The
Death of Discourse, the "logic" of much modem advertising cannot
be easily anchored in the harbor of Madisonian notions of an
enlightened electorate. 89 Hence, the commercial speech debate, as
evidenced by the arguments tendered by the likes of Sullivan and
Redish, often moves beyond that information rationale for
constitutionally protecting such expression.
Whatever one makes of such rationales, the drift of the Baker
and Piety argument (if their views can be incorporated together) is
that the problems of commercial speech can largely be reduced if
only courts withdraw constitutional (federal and state) protection
from commercial speech, however defined. But in our highly
commercial-entertainment culture, can we reasonably expect that
enough lawmakers will, in the first instance, routinely enact enough
meaningful laws to stem the tide of commercial speech? On that
score, it is worth noting that the rather rare consumer statute that
allowed Marc Kasky to sue Nike has since been amended out of
existence.9" My point: what evidence do we have that the people of
modernist America would freely abandon their consumerist ways and
embrace the reformist agenda of Baker and Piety? I fear, as noted
elsewhere,9' that such reforms could be seen as authoritarian in
today's highly commercial culture. Such a response, or one
derivative of it, finds predictable expression in Professor Redish's
declaration: "It is time to recognize opposition to commercial speech
protection for what it all too often is: a form of ideological hostility
87. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976); accord Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 445 (1971) [hereinafter Redish,
Marketplace].
88. See Redish, Marketplace, supra note 87, at 433 ("A cursory examination of current
television and periodical advertising reveals that in practice, comparatively little commercial
promotion performs.., a purely informational function.").
89. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 67-105.
90. See Carolyn Said, Proposition 64: Citizens' Right to Sue Limited, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4,
2004, at C1. The amended law is CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (Deering 2007).
91. DOD2, supra note 2, at 35-45.
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to the premises of capitalism and commercialism."92 While one need
not embrace that categorical characterization,93  it is an
understandable response to the Baker and Piety variety of categorical
denials of constitutional protection for a class of communication.
Professor Shiffrin's more nuanced jurisprudence, by contrast,
seems better suited to grapple with the tension between the reformist
agenda and the consumerist posture of life in modem America.
Again, it is important to note that though he would not place
commercial speech on the mantle of its political counterpart, he is,
nonetheless, open to some measure of protection for economic
expression. Without attempting to predict just how far he might
venture down that road, it may suffice to suggest that his paternalist
hand would withdraw First Amendment protection whenever some
harm might or would occur without such intervention. (I will say
more about the harm principle later in this Foreword.)
For now, it is enough to remember that where harm is the
measure, any variety of values94 comes into play in discerning its
very existence. Such value considerations (normative inquiries, if
you will) define both our notions of what is harmful, and thus
unprotected, and what is vital to our system of free expression, and
thus protected. The normative side of such definitional questions is
explored in Professor Robert Post's discerning contribution95 to this
Symposium. Starting with the proposition that "the First Amend-
ment does not protect 'speech as such,"' he stresses that the speech
we shield from abridgment is expression that "serves relevant First
92. Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 77, at 130-31.
93. Such a bold statement, of course, is in need of a measure of nuance. For one can attack
particular absolutist-like applications of the commercial speech doctrine and yet remain "loyal" to
the realities of the modem capitalist marketplace. Nonetheless, it is salutary to note that advanced
capitalism typically tends to excesses of all sorts, thus increasing the likelihood of paternalist
responses.
94. Shiffrin made this very point:
[T]he line between true and false speech is not bright .... Misleading speech is a half-
breed, true in form and even in effect for many, but false in the impressions it creates
for others. All language misleads some people to some extent. How many are too
many and how much is too much are questions of policy and degree. The distinction
between the true and the misleading is normative.
Shifflin, Away from a General Theory, supra note 5, at 1218-19.
95. Robert Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
169 (2007) [hereinafter Post, Viewpoint Discrimination].
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Amendment values." 96 However we define those values-and here,
for example, the gulf between Martin Redish and James Weinstein is
exceedingly vast-there is also the analytical concern of how and to
what extent different kinds of expression serve different kinds of
values. Or as Post puts it:
Because different forms of speech will serve these values in
different ways, constitutional protection will extend
differently to different forms of speech. It therefore makes
little sense to speak of speech as being "fully" protected;
what matters is that speech receive the forms of protection
necessary to guarantee that it will continue to serve relevant
First Amendment values. 7
Fair enough. But first identifying such values and then applying
them is-as Alexander Meiklejohn discovered when he had to retool
his rationalist, public discourse, free speech theory9 -no small feat.
In that regard, and reminiscent of Meiklejohn's predicament,
Professor Post's own information-based, rationalist-grounded ideal
of public discourse99 seems at odds with the culture in which
America today finds itself. A line from his response to Professor
Redish is revealing in that respect: "It is a mistake to conflate
democracy with libertarianism."'' °  Of that line alone one could
readily write a book. But in the interest of intellectual modesty,
permit me to tease out a few random thoughts.
By Professor Post's own measure, I suspect he might want to
qualify that assertion. Here are a few examples I humbly offer for
consideration, replete with my own qualifications in italics:
1. It is a mistake to conflate American constitutional democracy
with libertarianism.
2. It is a mistake to conflate traditional American constitutional
democracy with libertarianism.
96. Id. at 175 (quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
97. Id.
98. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245; see also William Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
99. For a critique of Professor Post and others who hold to his public discourse theory, see
LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 139-45 (2005).
100. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 95, at 175 (emphasis added).
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3. It is a mistake to conflate traditional American constitutional
democracy with contemporary libertarianism.
4. It is a mistake to conflate traditional American constitutional
democracy grounded in Madisonian notions of political
enlightenment with contemporary libertarianism.
The italicized qualifications, which I suppose are generally
faithful to Professor Post's vision of the First Amendment, clarify the
narrowing scope of what I take to be his understanding of what free
speech in modem America should be. If I am basically right on this
score, then these conclusions might well follow from such thinking:
1. It is accurate to conflate contemporary American
commercial-based democracy with contemporary notions of
libertarianism.
2. It is a mistake to conflate contemporary American
commercial-based democracy with Madisonian notions of
political enlightenment.
3. Contemporary American commercial-based democracy is
antithetical to Madisonian notions of political enlightenment.
4. To attempt to impose Madisonian notions of political
enlightenment on America's contemporary commercial-based
culture would be either futile or tyrannical (or, at least, seen
as such).
In all of this, one must not be oblivious to the obvious-namely,
that today's America is not that of yesteryear, let alone that of our
glorified notions of that period. The culture and the Court have
moved far beyond the paradigm of Central Hudson's rationalist,
informational function 1 ideal of the First Amendment. And while
Professor Post may applaud1"2 the limited protection afforded to
commercial speech in Board of Trustees of the State University of
New York v. Fox, °3 here, too, that is neither the constitutional"° nor
the cultural norm of our times.
101. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,563 (1980).
102. See Post, Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 95, at 177-78.
103. 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978)).
104. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996). It is noteworthy
that nowhere in Professor Post's thoughtful response to Professor Redish does he once refer to or
cite 44 Liquormart. In that regard, it is well to note what the author of the Fox opinion, Justice
Antonin Scalia, had to say in 44 Liquormart: "I share JUSTICE THOMAS's discomfort with the
Central Hudson test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy intuition to support it.
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Enter next Professor James Weinstein, whose astute contribution
to this Symposium posits a theory similar, at times, to Post's when it
comes to commercial speech. Early on in his article Weinstein
states: "I count myself among those who favor capitalism, market
solutions, and free trade, but who do not believe that commercial
speech is entitled to 'full' First Amendment protection."'0 5 Since no
category of expression could be entitled to full First Amendment
protection," 6 unless very narrowly defined, such a concession may
seem obvious. But unlike Post, it appears, Weinstein is nonethless
willing to protect truthful informational commercial expression
either along the lines currently employed by the Court or as a matter
of Fifth and Forteenth Amendment substantive due process.0 7 In his
words: "While the First Amendment provides an acceptable source
of protection for this interest, grounding a right to receive
commercial information in the liberty provision of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments would, in my view, more accurately reflect
the essence of the interest involved.'
10 8
While Weinstein is uncertain about the contours of his free
speech views-for example, what about largely non-cognitive
lifestyle advertising or artistic expression?-he is quite certain of the
following: "[B]ecause ordinary commercial speech is not a
constitutive part of the speech by which we govern ourselves, it is
not entitled to the rigorous protection primarily reserved for public
discourse."'0 9 Still, such speech, in Weinstein's view, can have real
value: "I do believe . ..that ordinary commercial advertising can
significantly promote individual economic decision-making and,
thus, undue restrictions on this speech can interfere with individual
I also share JUSTICE STEVENS's aversion towards paternalistic governmental policies that
prevent men and women from hearing facts that might not be good for them." 517 U.S. at 517
(Scalia, J., concurring in part).
105. Weinstein, supra note 32, at 135 n.8.
106. For example, even political discourse is subject to time, place, and manner restrictions
and could even be barred if it was intended and likely to produce imminent lawless action,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), or if it was defamatory, malicious and made
concerning a public official, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
107. Beyond what is set out in this Foreword, I base the assumptions mentioned above on
recent conversations with Professor Weinstein.
108. Weinstein, supra note 32, at 150 n.71 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 150 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Robert Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109,
1115-20 (1993)).
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autonomy protected by the Constitution.""' So, as noted above, he is
willing to protect certain forms of commercial expression. In that
qualified regard, he is no paternalist liberal: "[S]uppressing speech
for [certain] paternalistic reasons might well be unconstitutional even
if the speech is not part of public discourse.""'
It is that public discourse component that is central to Professor
Weinstein's thinking; and it is there where he parts company--quite
sharply-from Professor Redish concerning the centrality of
commercial expression in our First Amendment jurisprudence. The
"position that ordinary commercial speech should be afforded less
protection than political expression," says Weinstein, "flows from
the view that the core First Amendment value is democratic self-
governance, not, as Redish believes, self-realization. " '2  Hence,
when it comes to "public discourse," "rigorous" protection is the rule
insofar as it best fosters our "commitment to democratic self-
governance."' " Of course, for that public discourse to remain viable,
it ought not be undermined by the corruptive influences of a culture
wed to entertainment and commercialism. But on that score,
Weinstein parts company from Post et al. in allowing for some viable
measure of constitutional protection for commercial expression as it
operates in our modern culture. Never mind that his old lodestar is
clouded by the new skies in which it finds itself.
Beyond the firmament of such matters, the papers in this rich
Symposium raise a variety of other important issues. For example,
one may wonder whether the views espoused by Baker, Piety, and
Post, among others, do not in some way compound some of the very
problems of which they complain. That is, to the extent that such
views are premised on amoral, profit-maximizing notions of market
players, they may actually encourage the continuation of such a
transactional system infused with all sorts of different expressive
components. The articulation of this problem finds perceptive
commentary in Professor Seana Shiffrin's contribution to this
Symposium. ' In her own words:
110. Id. at 150 n.71.
111. Id. at 165-66 (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 139.
113. Id. at 144.
114. See Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, supra note 46.
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I'm not sure it is wise or desirable to adopt a theory that if
publicly known, accepted, and implemented would not only
treat market actors as amoral, but would encourage market
actors-whether producers, advertisers, or consumers-to
adopt this as a self-conception (that is, to think of
themselves as amoral, apolitical agents). "1
5
But do not categorical theories that deny First Amendment protection
to commercial and corporate expressive transactions (including those
of supporters of the organic farming movement' ,6) help to promote
amoral kinds of behavior in the marketplace? They say, in effect, to
the players in that market that since commercial expression is devoid
of any meaningful or elevated value, it is best to accept that notion
and compete in the market accordingly. Contrast such Machiavellian
notions of commercial competition with Seana Shiffrin's salutary
counsel:
If our lives are going to be dominated by a more
decentralized market, then we should encourage morally
motivated market activity and recognize forms of market
activity that attempt to moralize the market from within,
given the absence of a well-organized, coherent,
comprehensive form of external morally motivated
regulation.'
Hence, by this liberal measure certain compelled subsidization
of speech cases"--like those involving organic farmers forced to
subsidize advertisements antithetical to their values-should be
viewed as violating the First Amendment, the regulatory holding of
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.' notwithstanding.
This would be so even if the organic farmers were commercial
corporations and even if their messages were, in good part, profit
motivated.
115. Id. at325.
116. See id. at 324-25.
117. Id. at 325.
118. The doctrinal/theoretical exchange between Professors Sullivan and Post concerning
these cases is exceptionally rich, and worthy of careful study. See It's What's for Lunch:
Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef-the First Amendment and Compelled Commercial Speech, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359 (2007).
119. 521 U.S. 457, 477 (1997) (upholding compelled payment by fruit growers of generic
fruit growing ads).
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Seana Shiffrin's "more accommodationist approach" (vintage
Shiffrin) is premised on the assumption that "the correct First
Amendment analysis is not dictated purely by the sort of speech at
hand, but on a variety of non-speech-related factors."2'
Accordingly, the fact that an entity's "moral and political speech
appear[s] in market garb"' 2 does not alone settle the First
Amendment question. And why not? Consider Professor Seana
Shiffrin's explanation: "These enterprises are not best understood as
amoral business aiming to maximize profit. They are attempting to
integrate, express, and infuse moral and political concerns into
commercial interactions: by transforming the market from within
through political activism achieved in part through commerce."'22
I am not entirely sure whether there is enough conceptual
"wiggle room" in Professor Post's understanding of commercial
speech and the First Amendment 123 to countenance constitutional
protection of such corporate commercial claims. If not, that might
prompt some who subscribe to such views to pause. By the same
token, were such corporate commercial claims to find sanctuary
under some application of his views, this might prompt others to
consider the potentially troublesome ramifications of signing onto
them sans reservation.
Such uncertainties about Professor Post's own vision of the First
Amendment do not, of course, deny the value of his stinging critique
(and Professor Weinstein's, too) of runaway notions of a full-First-
Amendment-protection understanding of what our national
Constitution ought to protect within the realm of commercial
expression. If Justices Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas could
not soundly defend First Amendment absolutism in the context of
political expression, how then can Justice Thomas and his followers
fare any better in the context of commercial expression? But that
criterion need not be our only measure. For let none forget that
120. Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, supra note 46, at 327 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at322.
122. Id. at 325-26 (emphasis added).
123. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1
(2000); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood," 40 VAL. U. L. REV.
555 (2006); Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195; see also It's What's for Lunch, supra note 118 (Professor
Post stating that .... ).
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Justice Black's so-called absolutism made Justice Brennan's near-
absolutism seem sensible. Something of the same may be happening
in the commercial speech doctrinal arena, too.
Whatever the doctrinal direction of the commercial speech
cases, one thing seems clear: Governmental paternalism of the kind
championed in Posadas124 and Fox1 25 is far less likely to win the day
in the Supreme Court than it was decades ago. If this is true, what
does this portend for the regulatory state championed by liberals of
the past?
Modern Liberty: On Libertarianism
Talk of government paternalism-and the prospect of an endless
array of pestering paters-troubles libertarian lawyers like Bruce
Johnson,1 26 libertarian academics like Charles Fried1 27 (and Kathleen
Sullivan 21), and libertarian First Amendment theorists like Martin
Redish, the intellectual godfather of modem commercial speech
scholarship.'29 Like the free-spirited William 0. Douglas, who
changed his mind about not protecting commercial speech, 3 ° they
maintain that the Constitution was "designed to take the government
off the backs of people.''. True to that principle, they are nowhere
as divided or equivocal about protecting commercial expression as
their liberal counterparts.
Generally speaking, I think Professor Fried quite astutely depicts
the larger set of issues at work in this debate concerning commercial
speech. And I think he does that best in his recent book, Modern
Liberty,3 2 a book that made even the liberal Anthony Lewis "rethink
124. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 331
(1986) (upholding restrictions on casino advertising).
125. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1989) (allowing
potential restrictions on college campus advertising by lower courts).
126. See Johnson, supra note 16.
127. See Charles Fried, Philosophical Underpinnings of the First Amendment, 41 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 329 (2007).
128. See, e.g., It's Whats for Lunch, supra note 118, at 365-67, 369, 381 (noting Professor
Sullivan's somewhat playful use of the term "Stalinism" to refer to government paternalism).
129. See Redish, Marketplace, supra note 87.
130. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
131. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 8 (1980).
132. CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT (2007).
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the nature of liberty."'33 Early on in that work, from which the key
ideas of his Symposium remarks derive, Fried observes: "The
greatest enemy of liberty has always been some vision of the
good."'34 And without loading the dice, is that not the case here, too?
If liberals wish to restrict tobacco advertising, it is because they wish
to do something about centuries of cancer-killing products. So, too,
if they opt to regulate alcohol advertising, it is because they are duly
sensitive to the savaging effects of alcoholism in America. By the
same token, if they seek to control messages about unhealthy food, it
is because they have seen countless cases of cholesterol-related
deaths. And if liberals are particularly concerned about the impact of
all of the above on our minority communities, 35 it is because they
want life's forgotten ones to experience an equal measure of the
good life. Put another way, their notion of free speech is informed
not only by individual liberty but also by the collective good, to
which they are inclined to give greater weight than their libertarian
counterparts. Is it, then, that collective vision of the good that, in
Fried's words, makes them "enem[ies] of liberty"? Is their
unwillingness to let liberty be defined, in great measure, by the
demands and joys of the marketplace what renders them unsure
about the First Amendment as we know it today?
At the conceptual core of modern liberty is the belief, not
without warrant, that there is an important connection between
commerce and that freedom of the mind that coats the canvas of our
lives in awe-inspiring, life-affirming color. Though the liberty
deriving from it may be tagged "new," the idea is an old one. A page
of Medici history illustrates this larger point-Professor Fried's point
as earlier formulated by Tim Parks:
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a web of
credit was spun out across Europe, northward to London,
east as far as Constantinople, west to Barcelona, south to
Naples and Cyprus. At the heart of this dark web of usura
lay Florence. But in the same period, and above all in the
century that followed, the Tuscan city also produced some
133. See id. (appearing on the dustjacket and praising Fried, while commenting that Lewis
nonetheless "disagreed" with some of Fried's points).
134. Id. at 17.
135. See GEORGE HACKER, RONALD COLLINS & MICHAEL JACOBSON, MARKETING BOOZE
TO BLACKS (1987) (foreword by Barbara Jordan).
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of the finest painting and architecture the world has ever
seen. Never had stone blocks been cut more smoothly,
never were finer paradises painted on church walls. In the
Medici family in particular, the two phenomena-modem
banking, matchless art-were intimately linked and even
mutually sustaining .... With usura we have the Renais-
sance, no less.'36
This is not to deny the excesses of Medici capitalism, historical
or contemporary, but to stress instead how commerce can be vital to
civilization and the advancement of a culture of spirited and artistic
freedom. One does not have to open the casket of Lochner'37 to
concede that point. So, too, one need not discount the corrosive
effects of modern commercialism to appreciate such things.
The fact is as simple as it is complex: we are Americans;
modern liberty is our creed. It is a liberty that, despite itself, has
produced everything from the wondrous words of Jack Kerouac"3 s to
the magic of Stephen Sondheim'39 to the amazing photography of
Annie Leibovitz"4 ° to the poignant journalism of Nat Hentoff,"4' to
those creative Geico Gecko commercials 42 . . . and beyond.
"America," as my late friend Max Lerner used to say, "is a pretty
good God-damn country." Phrased differently, it may be the best of
all evils, if only because it is hard to imagine a vibrant system of
freedom of expression like ours in Castro's Cuba, or Putin's Russia,
or Jintao's China, or even in Brown's Britain.
All of capitalism's many faults notwithstanding, many liberals
nonetheless love their modern liberty. So when the Government
136. TIM PARKS, MEDICI MONEY: BANKING, METAPHYSICS, AND ART IN FIFTEENTH-
CENTURY FLORENCE 2 (2005). The Italian term usura did not necessarily connote usury as
understood today, but rather the charge of any interest, no matter what amount, on a loan of
money.
137. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
138. See, e.g., JACK KEROUAC, ON THE ROAD (Penguin Books 1976) (1959); see also Jack
Kerouac, After Me, the Deluge, CHI. TRIB. MAG., Sept. 28, 1969, at 20 ("[I]f it hadn't been for
western-style capitalism... I wouldn't have been able or allowed to hitchhike half broke thru 47
states of this Union and see the scene with my own eyes .... ).
139. See, e.g., STEPHEN SONDHEIM, SUNDAY IN THE PARK WITH GEORGE (RCA Records
1984).
140. See, e.g., ANNIE LEIBOVITZ, A PHOTOGRAPHER'S LIFE: 1990-2005 (2006).
141. See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, THE NAT HENTOFF READER (2001).
142. See, e.g., The Geico Gecko, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acCfnwTpdxU (last
visited Oct. 12, 2007).
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starts to "abridge" their communicative freedom they buck, and buck
again. Sure, they grant, there must be a few limits. Justice Clarence
Thomas's hints to the contrary, 43 they likewise realize that
commercial speech can never really be on the same plane as political
speech. Yet, the tendency, at times constrained, should move in that
general direction, they urge.
For other liberals, however, that tendency signals constitutional
and cultural catastrophe. Understandably concerned about the
potentially de-civilizing effects of modem capitalism and its impact
on our system of freedom of expression,'" they are increasingly
inclined to give up on the First Amendment as a way of countering
such excesses. That is, rather than protesting and petitioning against
the captains of commerce and the Huxleyan'45 world they have
ushered in, more and more liberals prefer instead for government to
silence commercial messages. Even if this were possible in a highly
capitalist culture such as ours,'46 it does not bode well for the spirit of
the First Amendment to argue that the only way to save free speech is
to silence free speech. There is something curious in maintaining
that our system of freedom of expression operates best when it
cabins the mind of our citizenry in the case of a certain class of
messages. His early tendencies to the contrary,'47 I think Alexander
Meiklejohn sensed the futility of his original free speech
jurisprudence; he realized its inability to function in a modern
capitalist society when he extended his theory of free speech to
include artistic expression,'48 which in our culture is quite regularly
143. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-19 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part).
144. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 9-33, 69-105, 139-77.
145. See id. at 3-7.
146. See id. at 107-19.
147. See Sharp, supra note 72, at xv-xvi.
148. See Meiklejohn, supra note 98, at 255-57. Zechariah Chafee flagged the problem with
Meiklejohn's free speech jurisprudence as early as 1949. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book
Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899-900 (1949) (reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (noting the "most serious weakness
in Mr. Meiklejohn's argument" as including his failure to include literary and artistic expression
as well as failure to protect speech related to one's knowledge of "economic forces")).
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linked to commerce. But something more is at stake here than
futility, important as that point is.'49
That something is a willingness, call it a Camusian struggle,50 if
you will-to affirmatively enlist the First Amendment to battle the
captains of commerce. If liberals believe that commercial messages
actually harm people, then why not counter such messages? While
some liberals may hesitate to take the credit, preferring instead to
don paternalist garb, others in the liberal camp should celebrate the
fact that at the end of the day our system of freedom of expression
did indeed expose the all-powerful Nike to be guilty of abhorrent
sweatshop practices.' Nike's attempt to buy its way out of the sun
of truth failed miserably. Is that not reason for liberal hope? Is that
not reason enough to believe that dissent-the voices of counter-
speech--can sometimes prevail?' 52 Perhaps. Still, legions of liberals
believe otherwise; they want to restrict much protection for
commercial expression. But why?
Enter Martin Redish, whose views on commercial expression
are often seen as either a denunciation of the modem liberal state or a
celebration of the modem libertarian state. His contribution to this
Symposium, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and
the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination,'53 is surely his
boldest statement on the topic to date. A few sample passages from
that article illustrate his ever-increasing frustration with liberals who
insist on treating commercial speech as the "stepchild of the First
Amendment."'54
0 Viewpoint discrimination. Many scholarly attacks on
commercial speech either constitute or facilitate or come
close to encouraging a "form of viewpoint regulation," which
is tantamount to suppression "based on the regulators'
subjective disagreement with or disdain for the views being
expressed."' 55
149. See Collins & Skover, Nike, supra note 20, at 1032 n.300.
150. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 216.
151. See Collins & Skover, Nike, supra note 20, at 975.
152. This is not, of course, to deny that dissent itself can sometimes be co-opted in a highly
commercial culture. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 115-17.
153. Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 77.
154. Id. at 67.
155. Id. at 69 & n.8.
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" Content neutrality. Viewpoint discrimination against
commercial speech is per se antithetical to basic notions of a
core First Amendment precept, content neutrality. For such
discrimination is "ultimately grounded in distaste for what
commercial speech facilitates and represents, in a manner
wholly unrelated to a properly value-neutral approach to First
Amendment interpretation."' 56
* Political-Commercial speech dichotomy. Theories that
ground the First Amendment in political speech, and thereby
discount the value of commercial speech, ignore the
relationship between the two: "[S]peech concerning
commercial products and services can facilitate private self-
government in much the same way that political speech
fosters collective self-government. Both private and
collective self-government are grounded in identical
normative concerns about self-development and self-
determination."
57
" Corporate identity and the First Amendment. Attempts to
deny First Amendment protection to corporations qua
corporations ignore a fundamental tenet of our free speech
jurisprudence: "If one assumes that the values of free speech
can be fostered by the receipt, as well as by the
communication, of expression, then it should logically make
no difference whether the speaker itself deserves the benefits
of the constitutional protection."'' 8
In all of the above ways, and others, Professor Redish strikes out
against his liberal critics: In one way or another, all of their views are
"grounded in the decision maker's preference for particular political
or ideological value preferences that would, in the decision maker's
view, be threatened or undermined by the extension of constitutional
protection to commercial speech."'59
156. Id. at 108.
157. Id. at 81 (footnote omitted). I'm not quite sure what to make of the notion of "private
self-government." I would have thought that the notions of private and government are
conceptually different creatures. Be that as it may, for a further elaboration of Redish's views on
commercial speech and democratic values, see MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH,
ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 14-62 (2001) [hereinafter REDISH,
MONEY TALKS].
158. Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 77, at 87 (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 109.
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As one who has been at the barrel end of Professor Redish's
rhetorical pistol, 6 ' I can readily understand why some liberals (like
Shiffrin, Post, Weinstein, Piety and Baker, among others) would
distance themselves from his bold libertarian views. And while I
find certain tenets of those views quite troublesome,' and likewise
share some of the reservations of his Symposium critics,'62 I
nonetheless think that Redish has leveled several significant
broadsides against certain liberals who, on the one hand, defend
robust expression and, on the other hand, reflexively draw away from
that principle in the case of commercial expression. This is even
more problematic given the realities of commerce and culture in
today's America. In light of the last fact, I wonder if time is not on
Martin Redish's side, at least in some general sense.
The Harm Principle
In that tumble of talk that we call discourse about commercial
expression, I think the crucial question comes down to this: just how
much "harm" will we tolerate before we permit the government to
"abridge" commercial speech? In one way or another, harm is the
governing principle that most often limits expression. From the law
of speech crimes (e.g., threats, conspiracy, fraud), to the law of civil
wrongs (e.g., copyrights, invasion of privacy), to the law of sexual
expression (e.g., child pornography), to the law of imminent danger
(e.g., fighting words), to regulatory law (e.g., insider trading), the
principle of harm defines the parameters of protection. Admittedly,
we do tolerate certain harms, as in the case of hate speech'63 or
specific kinds of defamation against public officials or figures. "6 But
generally speaking, the more attenuated the harm, or the greater the
160. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 49.
161. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 47-65, 100-01; Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover,
The First Amendment in Bold Relief A Reply, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1185 (1990).
162. See Post, Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 95; Seana Shiffrin, Compelled
Association, supra note 46; Weinstein, supra note 32.
163. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
164. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S.
323 (1974). For a criticism of such cases, see Lillian R. BeVier, The Invisible Hand of the
Marketplace of Ideas, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 232 (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (discussing the harm caused by defamation against
public officials and public figures).
Fall 2007]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
improbability of its real and substantial actuality, the more the
expression in question is likely to be protected.
While I understand that there are, to be sure, some nagging
analytical questions-for example, what exactly qualifies as
speech?'65-I think the harm point takes us further down the road to
liberty than abstract discussions of First Amendment values'66
tethered to antiquated notions no longer realizable in our commercial
culture. Mindful of the fact that the devil dwells in the details, let me
nonetheless chart out some ideas about how we might consider harm
and the values connected to it.
On the one hand, when commercial speech is clearly
synonymous with "theft by deception," '67 such expression is entitled
to no constitutional protection. And the closer commercial speech
nears that paradigm of prohibition, the more likely it may be
suppressed. Here the property principle, if you will, runs counter to
unchecked commercial communication. So, too, when commercial
speech clearly leads to actual injury by deception.'68 Generally
speaking, any form of regulatory law (civil or criminal) that would
bar or punish such expression does so to protect us from intentional,
reckless, or even negligent acts that cause real harm to real people.
Insofar as any form of libertarian expression runs afoul of that
standard of consumer protection, it also risks suppression. Here the
preservation principle, if you will, runs counter to unchecked
commercial communication.
On the other hand, the more would-be regulators attempt to
censor commercial speech along the lines of the Posadas69 principle
of paternalism, the more likely they are doomed to constitutional
failure, especially where the underlying information is factually true
as in 44 Liquormart. 7 Simply witness the fact that Justice John Paul
165. See Post, Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 95, at 174-75; see also REDISH, MONEY
TALKS, supra note 157, at 66-96.
166. While any notion of harm is, of course, informed by normative judgments, I nonetheless
think the harm principle provides a clearer lens by which to make analytical calls. On that count,
I concede, I may be splitting conceptual hairs.
167. See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT 177 (2004).
168. For example, cigarette ads that claim that smoking does not cause cancer.
169. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340-48
(1986) (upholding restrictions on casino advertising).
170. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510-16 (1996) (striking down law
regulating alcohol advertising); see also United States v. Caputo, Nos. 06-3612 & 06-3619, slip
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Stevens, the Court's stalwart liberal, urged "rigorous review" ' in
such cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, another liberal, agreed.
The harm principle can, of course, be read broadly. We see
examples of this in everything from Catharine MacKinnon and
Andrea Dworkin's views on the "harms" of pornography'7 2 to Justice
Stephen Breyer's views on the "harms" to the "structural democratic
governing process" '173 as reasons for reining in speech protections.
By such criteria, if the governing value of the First Amendment
were, say, rational discourse, then speech that undermined that value
could be said to be "harmful." That very scenario is what David
Skover and I labeled Huxleyan harm' 74-a harm most difficult to
cure in our entertainment-commercial culture. The problem with
defining harm in such broad ways is that it all too readily invites
oppression.
While the above conceptual sketches may delineate the general
First Amendment spectrum for many, there is certainly room for
debate. Though granting that, let me move the discourse to the next
level. Spectrum analysis of the kind I have outlined above begs an
important question, namely, what about that vast gray area in
between? It is because of that enormous and complex area that most
members of the Court have rejected "full" protection for commercial
expression."'
A few "easy" examples might help to illustrate my general
point. Consider, in that regard, the following:
* Clearly fraudulent commercial messages.
* Clearly misleading commercial messages.
op. at 7 (7th Cir., Feb. 27, 2008) (discussing the "anti-paternalist view of Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council and the cases that followed in its wake").
171. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion joined by Kennedy &
Ginsburg, JJ.).
172. See IN HARM'S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997). Regarding the "harms" of racist speech, see MARl J.
MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
173. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 39-55 (2005). See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225-
28 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
174. See DOD2, supra note 2, at 3-45.
175. See Weinstein, supra note 32, at 134-136 (listing justices opposed to "full" protection
for commercial expression).
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" Clearly dangerous commercial messages.'76
" Commercial messages clearly encouraging unlawful conduct.
In all of this, must the harm be actual? Imminent? Substantial?
Clearly demonstrable? But what about advertising messages in
which the actual harm is far more attenuated, as in the following
examples?:
* Truthful commercial messages about the price of cigarettes.
* Truthful commercial messages about the alcohol content of
beer.
* Truthful commercial messages about gambling.
" Truthful commercial messages about "gentlemen's clubs."
* Truthful commercial messages about abortion or condoms.
What if the commercial message is true as far as it goes, but more
information is needed to be fully informed? In such situations,
should the government compel a counter or explanatory message? If
so, what are the criteria for doing so? Mindful of such
Meiklejohnian-like concerns,'77 bear in mind that all information (as
Plato's Socratic dialogues demonstrate) is always incomplete when it
comes to ferreting out the truth. But when is truth sufficiently
incomplete to rise to the level of real harm? That is, if the harm
principle triggers government censorship, how do we define such
harm? (It is odd that, to the best of my knowledge, no one has yet
offered any extended analysis of the relationship between speech and
harm as the harm principle relates to various kinds of expression.)
The difficulty of defining harm in the commercial speech arena
is evidenced by the difficulty of defining misleading speech-a
category of expression most would deem to be harmful in the
commercial context. In Professor Rebecca Tushnet's thoughtful
contribution'78 to this Symposium, she skillfully points out that
definitional debates are not confined to language ambiguities about
phrases such as "Glass Wax" or "not tested on animals" or "Made in
176. For example, a commercial message regarding the use of a legal drug with serious side
effects.
177. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 148 (examining the foundations and structure of
free speech theory and criticizing Justice Holmes's theory of free speech as insufficient).
178. Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227 (2007).
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the U.S.' 79  While such examples of language confusion are
problematic enough for her, they do not exhaust the possibilities of
problems. For once norms-political, religious, cultural, and
economic-are openly poured into the beaker of commercial speech
analysis, the resulting mix could puzzle even Lewis Carroll.
Already, as Professor Tushnet observes, 8 ' we have consumer-
protection-like laws surfacing in the doctor-patient abortion
context. 8' Ironically, here conservatives seek to devalue commercial
speech while liberals seek to enrich it.'82
Once the definitional brush has been cleared, it may be possible
to consider spectrum of harm questions more openly."3 Whatever
value such harm considerations may have, their worth must also be
measured by the extent to which they find some, if any, application
to commercial speech penumbras. By that I mean that there are
certain ancillary issues related to the commercial speech inquiry-
issues that cannot so readily be confined to invitations to engage in
commercial transactions. In this regard, Bruce Johnson makes an
important point:
The indeterminacy of the commercial speech doctrine
surfaces in private causes of action in odd ways, such as in
tort claims of misappropriation, right of publicity claims,
statutory claims under trademark law and the Lanham Act,
and even certain claims arising under copyright laws and
the fair use doctrine.
84
While some of the contributions in this Symposium-particularly
those by Tushnet, Vladeck and Johnson-alert us to such matters,
their full scope has yet to be explored in connection with any First
Amendment jurisprudence of commercial expression.
179. Id. at 232, 234, 238. Ideologically speaking, are not such anti-abortion "informed
consent" laws the flipside, of sorts, of the pro-choice claim raised and vouchsafed in Bigelow v
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811,829 (1975)?
180. Tushnet, supra note 178, at 236-37.
181. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2007).
182. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 974-80.
183. 1 say "more openly" to allow for the real possibility that such considerations may be
taken into account at the definitional stage.
184. Johnson, supra note 16, at 305-306; see also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Protection of
Commercial Speech Under First Amendment Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2000).
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After the din of the ideological debate quiets down, and after the
doctrinal and conceptual waters clear a bit, and when definitional
hurdles are confronted, Steve Shiffrin's perceptive insights regarding
those irksome "small questions" '185 can help us greatly in grappling
with many of the issues I have flagged. Just where exactly that will
leave us, of course, is another matter. But for now, it is best to leave
well enough alone.
Recognizing the Law of Commercial Expression
Since this Symposium is in honor of my dear friend Steve
Shiffrin, it is fitting that I end this Foreword on a romantic, albeit
dissident, note.
In Poetry as Insurgent Art,'86 Lawrence Ferlinghetti (the famed
poet who a half-century ago fought to print Allen Ginsberg's
Howli"7) counsels: "Reinvent America and the world."'88 Given the
source and the message, I suppose Steve would heartily agree with
the rebellious poet, with a nod to old Walt Whitman, to be sure.
With that as a touchstone, perhaps now is the time to lay to rest
old paradigms, doctrines, and all other roadblocks to the path of
resourceful new thinking. For surely, there is much to be gained by
leaving the disjointed domain of commercial speech doctrine with its
rules in search of a rationale."8 9 In this rubble of rules, the inventive
few can brave into the breach and, in the spirit of the great bard, strip
their sleeves and show their scars as they create their world anew.
And then, looking back, let them say: "[T]hese wounds I had on
Crispin's day."' 9 ° Aww, Steve, does it get any better than that my
friend?
Well, enough with the poetry, now onto the law.., and to the
splendid Symposium that follows. In this extended Foreword I have
offered a few embryonic ideas-no general theory, to be sure !-that
might be helpful in thinking about what follows. Such offerings
185. Shiffrin, Away from a General Theory, supra note 5, at 1216.
186. LAWRENCE FERLINGHETTI, POETRY AS INSURGENT ART (2007).
187. ALLEN GINSBERG, HOWL AND OTHER POEMS (City Lights Books 1956). Regarding the
struggle to publish HOWL, see HOWL ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Bill
Morgan & Nancy J. Peters eds., 2006). See also RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, MANIA:
THE MADCAP STORY OF THE LIVES THAT LAUNCHED A GENERATION (forthcoming 2008).
188. FERLNGHETTI, supra note 186, at 10.
189. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 16, at 303-11; Note, supra note 46, at 1894-99.
190. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE FIFTH act 4, sc. 3.
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notwithstanding, the richness of the various contributions to this
Symposium will prove immensely valuable to anyone genuinely
interested in the First Amendment and its future in American culture
and constitutional law.
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